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 Feminist Ethics and Everyday Inequalities
 SAMANTHA BRENNAN
 How should feminist philosophers regard the inequalities that structure the lives of
 women? Some of these inequalities are trivial and others are not; together they form a
 framework of unequal treatment that shapes women's lives. This paper asks what
 priority we should give inequalities that affect women; it critically analyzes Claudia
 Card's view that feminists ought to give evils priority. Sometimes ending gender-based
 inequalities is the best route to eliminating gender-based evil.
 PART I
 How should feminist philosophers regard the many and various inequalities
 that structure the everyday lives of North American women?' Some of these
 inequalities are trivial and others are not, but regardless of whether they are
 individually trivial, together they form a framework of unequal treatment that
 structures women's lives. Of course, gender is not the only variable that affects
 equality of treatment and outcome. Race, physical ability, class, and sexual
 orientation are other factors that play a role; when these factors combine, the
 situation is even more complicated. Also, inequality is not the only morally
 relevant aspect of women's oppression, and feminist theorists and activists may
 need to make difficult decisions about which aspects of women's oppression
 should shape our efforts. This paper focuses on the inequalities that affect
 women as women, and asks what priority we should give them.
 Let's begin by considering an everyday inequality that is clearly on the less
 serious side. I have chosen this example specifically because it is trivial.
 Women, it seems, wait longer in coffee shops for their orders than do men.2
 American economist Caitlin Knowles Myers, along with her students, timed
 the service in eight coffee shops in Boston (Myers 2007). She concluded that
 Hypatia vol. 24, no. 1 (Winter, 2009) (9 by Samantha Brennan
This content downloaded from 129.100.58.76 on Tue, 03 Oct 2017 20:27:16 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 142 Hypatia
 men get their coffee twenty seconds earlier than do women. And it's not just
 women who wait longer. The researchers found that black women and men
 wait longer than white women and men, the young wait longer than the old,
 and the ugly wait longer than the beautiful. Suppose that this isn't just a local
 phenomenon and it turns out that women in general wait longer for coffee or
 ders. This would not be shocking or surprising. However, try as I might, I
 actually can't work up much moral outrage over the extra time I wait for my
 coffee. I don't much like waiting, and I especially don't like waiting when I
 haven't yet had a cup of coffee, but those responses are personal and don't gen
 erate moral outrage. That's because even if these differences in treatment in the
 coffee shop are pervasive, they are still part of a pretty luxurious lifestyle. If
 considerations of equality and justice enter my mind in the morning coffee line
 at all they are of two rather different sorts. Thanks to the success of the fair
 trade movement, I may wonder where the coffee came from and how the peo
 ple who produced it were treated. Thanks to Peter Singer and legions of other
 utilitarian moral philosophers who have used one's morning coffee purchase
 as an example, I may wonder why am I spending so much money on coffee
 when that money could be better spent on food, water, and basic medical
 services for the very poor thus saving the lives of people in the developing
 world. I do not think I have ever wondered or worried about the way I am
 being treated by the coffee-shop staff, who earn a lot less money than I do and
 have a lot less job security. Protesting the extra wait time in coffee shops
 which, by the way, is not caused by women ordering fancier, more difficult-to
 prepare drinks-would be exactly the sort of action that gets feminists
 branded as "spoiled and whiny."
 The problem is that the coffee-shop line is far from the only inequality that
 benefits men over women. Indeed, if all the examples of gender inequality were
 like the coffee-shop example the problem of the treatment of women in our
 society would hardly be pressing at all; however, there is a cost attached to
 gender that shows up in examples that range from the relatively trivial to the
 very serious. On the less serious side, women pay more for haircuts, dry clean
 ing, and cars. More seriously, we also earn less, are less well represented in our
 political institutions, do more than our fair share of household work, enjoy less
 personal security on city streets, and have less leisure time than do our male
 counterparts. You can pick your own favorite set of examples if you like. Not
 surprisingly, the ones that move me are the ones from the world of the univer
 sity. Here is an example that surprised me when I heard it, though perhaps it
 ought not to have been shocking: studies show that having a female-gendered
 name on an academic curriculum vitae costs candidates in a process of peer
 evaluation, both for hiring and for promotion and tenure (Wenner as and Wold
 1997; Steinpreis, Anders, and Ritzke 1999). Further, this is true simply on the
 basis of the gender of the name. The vitas used in the first study were identical,
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 so it is not a case of the referees placing less value on the kind of work published
 by women or making judgments about where women publish.
 In the now infamous "Ruth/Robert" vita study, professors of psychology
 were asked to evaluate applications for a tenure-track position (Steinpreis,
 Anders, and Ritzke 1999). Two different vitas were used in the study. One
 was a vita of a stellar candidate, while the other was just average. For half
 the professors, the name on the vita was male, for the other half the name
 was female. Those evaluating the vitas were then asked what they thought
 about the candidate's research productivity and teaching experience.
 Evaluators were also asked whether they would hire this candidate at their
 university. Gender made no difference in the case of the stellar candi
 date. However, the study's designers worried that they may have erred in using
 a vita that was simply too stellar, too good to be denied (Steinpreis, Anders,
 and Ritzke 1999, 524). In the case of the average vita, the male was rated
 as having higher research productivity. For both teaching experience and
 research, candidates were rated as having "good productivity" when the name
 was male, and "less good productivity" when the name was female. In answer
 to the question as to whether they would hire the candidate, 70% said yes for
 the male, 45% for the female. Both male and female evaluators were guilty of
 bias, with women being just as likely to give lower scores to the vita with the
 female name.
 Other studies have found similar results. In a study published in the presti
 gious science journal Nature, the focus was on the role of gender in the
 evaluation of candidates for post-doctoral fellowships. These evaluations are
 carried out with the referees knowing the names of the candidates, so in most
 cases the referees would also know the candidates' genders. Again, gender made
 a difference. Female candidates had to have more publications, with higher
 impact ratings, to achieve the same level of success as male candidates
 (Wenneraos and Wold 1997). The study's authors were able to calculate the
 "cost" of attaching a female name to a vita in terms of the evaluation it would
 receive. On the upside, these studies suggest possible routes for change. Where
 one suspects that decisions are being made on the basis of gender rather than
 merit, removing indication of gender may improve the quality of the decisions
 made. For example, double-anonymous peer review was introduced by the jour
 nal Behavioral Ecology; after this change, there was a significant increase in
 female first-authored papers (Budden 2008).3 This method won't help in the
 traditional promotion and tenure-review process because most qualified review
 ers will be aware of the identity of the author, and his/her gender, even if not
 informed of this by the candidate's institution, but there is enough evidence to
 suggest it ought to be the standard practice at all journals. Double-anonymous
 review is not currently practiced in philosophy's top mainstream journals such as
 the Jourmal of Philosophy or Philosophical Review.
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 Unfair evaluation by peers in the process of collegial review is just one very
 small part of a much larger picture, and we're all familiar with the end result.
 According to a report published by the Barnard Center for Research on
 Women, "Gender inequities have proven to be stubbornly resistant to change
 at the level of the professoriate; women continue to be disproportionately em
 ployed in part-time and limited-term positions; their rate of advancement
 through the ranks and their representation at the highest faculty ranks remains
 below that of men. These differences hold for minority faculty, they are com
 pounded for minority women, and they are amplified at more elite institutions"
 (Wylie, Jackson, and Fosado 2007).
 Further, the university is itself part of a larger world in which women fare
 worse than men in almost every aspect of life. (One notable exception concerns
 average life span. )4 These inequalities persist despite the eradication of most of
 the formal barriers to women's equality. With only a few exceptions (such as
 combat duty in the U.S. military), there are very few occupations or fields of
 study that are not open to women. In Canada, women's equality of opportunity
 is further backed by enshrinement of equality rights in the Canadian Charter of
 Rights and Freedoms. While the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Consti
 tution failed to gather sufficient support, women's equality of opportunity in the
 workplace has officially had legal protection since the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
 However, no one need intend to treat women differently. Note that in both
 the serious vita-evaluation case and in the trivial coffee-queue case it is most
 likely that none are aware that they are treating women differently than men.
 We can easily imagine in the evaluation case that the evaluators themselves
 would be shocked at the study's results. In both the coffee case and the vita
 case, the lack of intent to discriminate makes it very difficult to see how to
 achieve change. Would education about bias be sufficient? Based on my own
 experiences in the university context, one suspects not. Typically, one hears
 about subconscious discrimination and bias, can feel certain in one's knowl
 edge that others so discriminate, and at the same time feel certain that one's
 own judgments are without bias.
 So, in the West at least, there are very few remaining formal, institutional
 inequalities and in many cases, no individual intention to treat women differ
 ently than men. Nonetheless, inequalities between men and women persist and
 affect women on a daily basis. How should feminists regard these everyday in
 equalities? The problem is that feminism pulls us in two different directions,
 and while it's hard for me to feel the pull in the coffee case, I have no difficulty
 at all generating outrage in the evaluation case, despite the fact that feminist
 academics in the developed world are among the world's most affluent people,
 leading lives that are rich in material goods and in the freedom to enjoy them.
 An aside: university professors love to complain about how badly paid we
 are but such whining is not supported by the facts. Consider my own case.
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 According to Statistics Canada, I am a "high-income" Canadian (Statistics
 Canada 2007). "High-income" means that my university salary puts me in the
 top five percent of income earners in my country. Not surprisingly, that group is
 more than three-quarters male. The group of "high-income" Canadians, the
 five percent of the population who earn more than $89,000 a year, are the
 richest citizens in a rich nation. Even tenure-track, beginning academics in
 Canada do very well. With starting salaries in the $60,000 or more range, they
 are in the top quarter of all income earners and well above the low-income
 cutoff, which is in the mid $20,000s.5 There are interesting differences between
 Canada and the United States but these differences appear, for the most part, at
 the very top and the very bottom ends of the income scale.
 In this context, complaints I might make about men who earn more than
 I do look more and more like gripes about unequal treatment in the coffee-shop
 queue. It is illustrative to measure our affluence in terms of "how many planet
 Earths" we would need for everyone in the world to live like we do. (If every
 one lived like people in Vancouver or Toronto, we would need four planet
 Earths. Like Seattle or Calgary, five planet Earths. We would do better if we all
 lived like Europeans but we would still need two planet Earths. See www.
 myfootprint.org for a personalized version of this measure.) As well, our lives
 are, for the most part, lived in conditions of security and peace. We do not live
 in war zones and our rights to free speech, movement, and political participation
 are secure. As moral philosophers, or simply as educated citizens, we are aware of
 the quality of the lives lived by people in poor countries. While thinking about
 it one way, from a global perspective, it can look as if North American feminists
 are simply arguing that women need our fair share of first-world wealth, power,
 and privilege. Similar criticisms of the feminist movement's focus on discrim
 ination against women in our political, legal, and educational institutions have
 been made by writers and activists whose own work focusing on class, ability,
 and race. Yet we also see the injustice in the role gender plays in the evaluation
 of academic vitas. In the grand scheme of things, being evaluated partly on the
 basis of one's gender is not that bad, but it is still unfair and unjust.
 How seriously should we take these everyday inequalities? Claudia Card has a
 straightforward position on the relative importance of inequalities. Her view,
 simply stated, is that we should not give them priority over evils. She thinks that
 a feminism shaped too much by a focus on inequality misses out on the most
 morally pressing aspects of women's subordination. Card claims that moral phi
 losophers and social activists should give priority to ending evil, rather than to
 eliminating inequality. In a world that contains a great deal of very real evil,
 argues Card, we should focus our attention on the elimination of evil over the
 elimination of unjust inequalities. I share Card's intuition that the very bad
 ought to take priority over the merely rotten. This intuition is behind the view
 known as "negative utilitarianism," in which the bad (say pain and suffering)
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 gets weighed more heavily than the good (say pleasure and happiness) in the
 utilitarian calculus. I've felt this pull when teaching theories of the good and
 human well-being to yet another class of graduate students when what seems far
 more pressing is understanding the appeal of the bad and our failure to be moved
 by the cause of its elimination. "Forget promoting the good," I want to say.
 "Can't we just settle for more modest aims, like producing a little less bad?"
 Card's point is a little different from this though, because in my statement of
 the problem I've described bad and good on a continuum. On Card's view, bad
 and evil are of different kinds and can't be distinguished merely by magnitude.
 Largely I agree with Card that feminists ought to focus on evil's elimination. In
 the course of the discussion that follows, I also argue that the link between
 inequality and evil is such that even if we are really concerned most of all about
 evil, we also ought to care about ending inequality as part of it. I take this to be
 a "friendly" continuation, or extension, of the view Card develops, but I sus
 pect she might find some of my assumptions to be overly optimistic. Although
 there are some real differences between the politics and underlying views of
 liberal versus radical feminists, paying attention to the links between evil and
 inequality will show that there is considerable common ground between these
 different versions of feminism as well.
 Card writes, "Feminists and other political activists working for social justice
 or liberation should give priority to addressing evils over the goal of eliminating
 unjust inequalities" (Card 2002, 96). There are three elements, on Card's ac
 count, that make an act evil. She writes that an evil is a harm that is reasonably
 foreseeable, culpably inflicted, and deprives, or risks depriving, others of the
 basics that are necessary to make a life possible and tolerable or decent (Card
 2002, 16). Insofar as oppression leaves its victims with diminished potentials,
 severe oppression is a paradigm case of evil. Card's thesis is not just a view about
 normative ethics. It also concerns the moral force of feminism as a political
 movement. Card worries that North American feminism, in particular, has fo
 cused on securing equal political and economic rights for women (inequalities)
 and prioritized these problems rather than focusing on domestic violence and
 traffic in women and girls (evils). To use another of Card's examples, North
 American feminism has erred in focusing on the gender-based wage inequali
 ties in developed nations over the systemically produced poverty that deprives
 many children in the developing world of the basics needed to make life tol
 erable (Card 2002, 109).
 In my examination of Card's view, there is rather a lot I want to take as
 given. It's not that I agree with everything Card says. Instead, my own interest
 lies in what might be said in defense of some of the projects and goals of liberal
 feminism. In particular, I am not going to criticize Card's account of evil.
 On Card's view, evil consists in "reasonably foreseeable intolerable harms
 produced by culpable wrongdoing." What makes an act evil as opposed to
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 merely wrong, on Card's view, is not the intentions of the wrongdoer (as many
 have thought). Rather, an act's counting as evil rests on the severity of the
 harm inflicted on its victims. "Evils tend to ruin lives, or significant parts of
 lives," writes Card (Card 2002, 3). Central to Card's account of evil is the no
 tion of atrocity. An atrocity is a paradigmatic act of evil. But there are some
 difficult questions lurking about precision and priority. Card does not mean
 that in giving priority to evil we should award it lexical priority, so that we must
 end all evil before attacking any injustice. Instead, it's more a matter of focus
 and emphasis. I agree with Card's claim that mainstream North American
 feminism has tended to focus on inequality. In what follows, I want to look at
 some connections between inequality and evil, and say a bit more about what
 exactly it means to focus on inequality.
 PART 2: PROBLEMS WITH PRIORITIZING EVILS
 In this section, I examine some worries about Card's claim that we ought to
 give priority to eliminating evil over ending inequality. Adam Morton raises
 the first worry, and it has to do with situations in which we might want to make
 trade-offs between ending widespread inequalities and ending a medium-sized
 evil. I also consider two ways in which I think Card mischaracterizes egalitarian
 concern. First, she assumes that we must value equality intrinsically if we are to
 value it at all. Second, she assumes that egalitarians care only about equality,
 not about equality as part of a pluralistic conception of the good.
 MORTON'S WORRY ABOUT TRADE-OFFS
 One problem that has been raised in response to Card's views concerns how
 much priority the ending of evils ought to get over the elimination of inequal
 ities. In a paper on Card's account of evil, Morton considers the implications of
 Card's view for trade-offs between medium-sized evils and large-scale injustices.
 Morton's worry is that we tend to discount the importance of smaller harms that
 are distributed across large numbers of people. We tend to give greater impor
 tance to a small number of really big, bad events than we do to a much larger
 number of less bad events, even when the total amount of bad is the same and
 perhaps even when the total is greater in the case of the less bad events. When
 thinking about Card's work, Morton sees the potential for similar discounting
 when we compare lesser injustices to medium-sized evils. Card's view says to
 prioritize evils, but Morton worries that if the lesser injustices apply to enough
 people, we'll have missed something of moral significance. Writes Morton:
 "The conflict arises when we assume that gross injustice does compete with the
 elimination of evils, so that the fighting issue is the competition between lesser
 injustices and the elimination of, say, medium-sized evils" (Morton 2004, 198).
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 As examples of medium-sized evils, Morton considers the cases of minor
 childhood neglect and slight hunger caused by parental carelessness (Morton
 2004, 199). Morton constructively offers Card various suggestions for ways to
 resolve the trade-off problem. But I think Morton's criticisms miss the mark, for
 they misunderstand two aspects of Card's view. They underestimate the
 strength of her account of evils, and they also overestimate the strength of
 Card's account of priority. In a reply to Morton, Card denies that in the case of
 the "slightly hungry" children or in the case of the cold, neglected dog, any evil
 has been done. So it's not clear that there are medium-sized evils, on Card's
 "life-ruining" account of evil, if what we mean by a medium-sized evil is one
 that causes a medium amount of harm, such that it is bad but not life-ruining.
 There may be medium-sized harms, but on Card's account, that isn't sufficient
 for them to count as evil. Real evils can, and do, occur to animals, on Card's
 view, as in the case of routine pain and suffering inflicted in mass-production
 slaughterhouses, but mere neglect is not evil. Further, the priority Card's view
 gives to evils is not the lexical priority view that Morton ascribes to her. In
 deed, Card worries that her view is too weak on the question of what it means
 to give evils priority. "Prioritizing evils is making sure that over time, some
 thing significant is done about them, whatever else is done" (Card 2004, 215).
 But the priority we are to give to evils is hypothetical. Writes Card: "With luck
 it may be possible to do something significant about both" (Card 2004, 215). I
 suspect that if Morton were to reply to Card, there would be room for a discus
 sion on just this point. If it is not lexical priority, but instead it is merely a
 matter of paying more attention to evils than to inequalities, or making evils
 rather than inequalities our focus, then I think we do need more information
 about what counts as successfully prioritizing evils and what counts as a failure.
 One can ask for clear cases of success and failure without thinking that a strict
 schedule of the trade-offs-between acting to end evils versus acting to end
 inequality-is attainable. Another way of putting this point is to say that there
 can be clear cases at either end of the success-failure spectrum even if there is a
 lot of murky gray in the middle. It need not follow from the existence cases,
 where we cannot make judgments about trade-offs, that there are no clear
 cases. I don't think that this aspect of Morton's criticism is unreasonable if
 Card's theory is meant to guide our actions.
 In the final section of this paper, I want to give further support for Card's
 thought that we might be able to combat evils and inequalities at the same
 time. This is because there is a connection between inequalities and evil.
 NEED EQUALITY HAVE INTRINSIC VALUE?
 A related difficulty with Card's view that evils ought to get priority concerns
 her characterization of those who are concerned about equality. Card assumes
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 that to care about equality, from a moral point of view, is to care about its
 intrinsic value. On this way of thinking about equality as a moral value, equal
 ity matters in and of itself. To say that equality matters intrinsically is to say
 that it is good morally speaking, apart from the effects it has on human well
 being. We may wish to call those who think that equality matters and that it
 matters intrinsically "egalitarians." While I think it is good for reasons of clarity
 to limit the label "egalitarian" to those who think that equality has intrinsic
 value, it is worth noting that much contemporary usage of the term deviates
 from this. Many moral philosophers who are concerned about equality are con
 cerned about its instrumental value. There may be some good arguments
 against the intrinsic value of equality but even if those arguments are successful,
 it still may make sense to care about equality because of its instrumental value.
 Part of the problem with Card's view here is that she makes use of arguments
 against egalitarianism put forward by Harry Frankfurt and Joseph Raz (Frank
 furt 1987, Raz 1986). Like Card, Frankfurt and Raz are concerned that the
 focus on equality is mistaken, and that what matters morally speaking is that
 everyone have enough, that is, sufficiency rather than mere equality. Frankfurt
 and Raz take on as their target the view that equality itself has intrinsic value
 and that inequality has intrinsic disvalue. Again, many people whom we think
 of as egalitarians don't actually believe that equality's goodness lies in its in
 trinsic value. Consider the very simple case of the common utilitarian
 argument for the redistribution of wealth to a more egalitarian pattern. Utili
 tarians argue that we are better off overall with a more egalitarian distribution
 of wealth and goods because we get greater gains in utility by allocating re
 sources at the lower end.6 For people who are very badly off, a small increase in
 wealth makes a tremendous difference. Utilitarians focus on equality as an
 instrumental value.
 There are other familiar views that value equality instrumentally. One note
 worthy example is John Rawls. If anyone is called an egalitarian, it is Rawls,
 but his focus is on the level of well-being of the worst-off members of a society,
 and equality itself is of only secondary importance (Rawls 1971). Larry Temkin
 refers to views like Rawls's as "extended humanitarianism" because they fo
 cus specifically on the well-being of the worst (Temkin 1993, 8). He writes,
 "Extended humanitarianism resembles utilitarianism in the following respect.
 Just as equality will often be endorsed by utilitarianism as a means to promoting
 its end, so too equality will often be endorsed by extended humanitarianism as
 a means to promoting its end. However, on neither view is value attached to
 equality per se" (Temkin 1993, 247).
 Now, with the distinction between valuing equality intrinsically and valu
 ing it instrumentally in hand, we can ask the question from the point of view
 of feminist politics. Does it make sense to describe only those feminists who
 think that equality has intrinsic value as feminist egalitarians? I think it's more
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 sensible to think about feminist egalitarianism from the point of view of the
 policies advocated and the causes one takes on, not the underlying moral rea
 son one has for advocating those policies or taking on those causes. Thus, some
 feminists might be champions of egalitarian policies because they think that
 equality itself has moral worth and that a more equal world is itself a better
 world, while others may think that more egalitarian policies are likely to lead to
 better states of affairs from the perspective of increasing overall welfare. Still
 others might be feminist deontologists who think that equal treatment best ex
 presses the fundamental equal worth of persons. As a feminist moral theorist
 myself, I'm unsure what I think about the intrinsic value of equality. Many of
 the intuitions I have about morally better or worse worlds could just as well be
 explained as arising from a concern about desert, or about the welfare of the less
 well-off members of our society. I'm not sure where I stand on the intrinsic
 value of equality although I care about equality very much. The point is that
 one cannot throw out feminist concern for equality on the basis of arguments
 against the intrinsic value of equality when many feminists who value equality
 may do so on other grounds.
 VALUING EQUALITY AS ONE ASPECT OF THE GOOD
 Card also seems to assume that those who care about equality care only about
 equality. A position that combines these two aspects of Card's characterization
 of egalitarianism-equality is all that matters and it matters intrinsically-is
 completely implausible; no egalitarians actually hold this view. Call the posi
 tion that only equality matters "pure egalitarianism." According to pure
 egalitarianism, we improve a world in which half of the people are blind and
 the other half are not by blinding the lot of them. Whether or not they think
 equality has intrinsic value or only instrumental value, egalitarians do not be
 lieve it's the only morally relevant factor. They think that well-being also
 matters. Thus, the fully blind world might be better from the point of view of
 equality, but we need not say it is better overall because well-being also has
 moral significance. Writes Temkin: "Do I really think there is some respect in
 which a world where only some are blind is worse than one where all are? Yes.
 Does this mean I think it would be better if we blinded everybody? No. Equality
 is not all the matters" (Temkin 1993, 282). According to Temkin, all reason
 able egalitarianisms are pluralist egalitarianisms.
 This is not to say that egalitarianism is implausible, only that a certain char
 acterization of egalitarianism is implausible. It is a useful and important exercise
 to do as Temkin does and ask strictly from the point of view of equality when is
 one world better than another, but on its own, pure egalitarianism makes for an
 inadequate theory of moral value. Card puts her worry this way: "Equality as an
 ethical and political value abstracts from particular levels of welfare. Its con
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 cern is the distribution of benefits and burdens among persons or groups, not
 with the quality or even quantity of what is distributed" (Card 2002, 96). This
 is only a worry if one subscribes to a monist theory of the good with equality as
 the sole value.
 Aside from well-being there may be other values that egalitarians subscribe
 to as part of their account of the good. Egalitarians need not think that equality
 is the only moral value, nor even equality and well-being. Temkin, for exam
 ple, builds desert into his characterization of egalitarianism. He writes,
 "Egalitarians generally believe that it is bad for some to be worse off than oth
 ers through no fault or choice of their own. This is because, typically, if one
 person is worse off than another through no fault or choice of her own, the
 situation seems comparatively unfair, and hence, the inequality will be objec
 tionable" (Temkin 2003, 767). This is because deserved inequalities aren't
 unfair, while undeserved inequalities are unfair, according to Temkin. Feminist
 egalitarians may want other factors that merit moral concern built into their
 theory. Any theory that is pluralist in this way will need to say something about
 how the various factors are to be weighed and balanced against one another,
 but this is a different worry than the worry Card raises, which is against equality
 as the sole factor on which a moral theory is built.
 PART 3: LINKS BETWEEN INEQUALITY AND EVIL
 Rather than engaging in the project of seeing how best to weigh evils against
 injustice, I want to see how the two might be connected. In doing so, I also
 want to find some common ground between liberal and radical versions of
 feminism. By "liberal feminism" I mean that tendency within feminist thought
 to focus on women's rights and freedoms. Liberal feminism looks primarily
 to education as well as legal and institutional reform as the main methods of
 social change. By "radical feminism" I mean the tendency within feminist
 thought and political action to focus on women's sexual subordination and to
 see violence and sexual exploitation as the cornerstones of women's oppres
 sion. I think it is less clear what routes to social change are favored by radical
 feminists; a wide range of tactics have been pursued by radical feminists in
 campaigns to reduce, and eventually end, women's oppression. Separating our
 goals-such as increasing the number of female judges or providing adequate
 funding for battered women's shelters-from the methods we use to advance
 those goals can help us see space for common ground between liberal and rad
 ical feminism.
 Card writes that "when feminism is dominated by the rhetoric of inequality,
 it tends not even to discuss the worse evils" (Card 2002, 98). I agree with Card
 that feminist political movements make a mistake when they focus too much
 on improving the lot of affluent, first-world women. I found Card's list of what
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 feminism's priorities ought to be moving and compelling. She writes that
 "Feminism, for example, should in general prioritize ending domestic violence,
 rape (especially forcible 'incest' perpetrated on children), severely hazardous
 working conditions, and involuntary homelessness over many, perhaps most,
 inequalities in wages, hiring, promotions, and admissions. Yet we hear rela
 tively little about domestic violence, rape, hazardous working conditions, and
 homelessness, compared with debates regarding inequalities in wages, hiring,
 promotions, and admissions" (Card 2002, 105).
 What's the source of this mistake? There are some obvious targets in our
 culture of narcissism with its focus on the self.7 In the absence of traditional
 social values such as church and family, many social theorists fear that individ
 ualism and consumerism have resulted in a society in which people are more
 likely to focus on their own accomplishments and well-being than on broader
 social values or concerns. Given that North American feminists aren't isolated
 from the values of affluence and acquisition that seem too pervasive in our cul
 ture, it would be unreasonable to expect the theories we develop to be
 uninfluenced by them. Academic theorists of feminism might ourselves be
 more likely to experience inequalities than real evils. Indeed, some feminists'
 anger these days seems to be directed more at getting a "fair share" of the good
 ies than at changing our understanding of the kinds of lives that are good to
 lead. I am not denying that these factors might be playing a role, but in a way
 they are external to feminism; they are outside influences on the shape some
 versions of North American feminism have taken. There are also elements in
 ternal to the politics of feminism that result in a focus on the inequalities that
 are experienced by feminist theorists, rather than on evils that afflict women.
 One is feminism's insistence on the shared features of women's oppression. We
 are encouraged to seek common ground across barriers of ability, class, and
 race. But there are dangers in this way of thinking about feminism. First, it can
 result in a kind of navel-gazing where we artificially elevate to grander signif
 icance things that are important to us locally. Second, we can start to mistake
 connection for sameness and think that because we share aspects of oppressive
 experience with other women, we share them equally. For obvious reasons the
 most common of these points of shared experience concern women's embodied
 experience; here I mention just two of them.
 I was recently on the sidelines of a discussion between academic feminists on
 the subject of the U.S. presidential election. In a comment on the contenders
 for the leadership of the Democratic Party, someone supported Hillary Clin
 ton's feminist credentials. She claimed that Clinton's experiences as a woman
 would make a difference, adding that Clinton shares with all women the risk of
 rape. But of course there is a real difference between how much personal secu
 rity Hillary Clinton enjoys compared with the danger of rape faced by poor,
 working-class women, who of necessity live in dangerous neighborhoods, work
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 late at night, travel to work on foot or by public transit, and, unlike Clinton,
 lack personal bodyguards. Yet there is some sense in which both sides are right.
 There are similarities and differences in the experiences of women, and fem
 inism must be sensitive to both the similarities and the differences.
 Likewise, feminists have tried to find common cause in our oppression
 as mothers. But this too can go badly wrong. Consider Naomi Wolf's book
 Misconceptions, which struck me as an example of self-absorbed feminism (Wolf
 2001; see also Brennan 2002). Wolf begins with an awareness of the limits of
 theorizing about the downside of contemporary motherhood from her large
 house on a lonely, no-sidewalked boulevard in the suburbs of Washington,
 D.C. Wolf even interviews her baby's nanny about mothering, and she recog
 nizes that her experience of caring for the baby alongside a nanny is radically
 different from that of women who live in crowded urban or rural environments
 in which there is a large number of mothers, aunts, sisters, and grandmothers all
 caring for children together. But her focus on the loneliness and isolation of
 upper-class mothering misses out on what's bad about mothering from the
 point of view of women who, for reasons of financial necessity, must work long
 hours, sometimes at multiple jobs, leaving children unsupervised or badly
 supervised.
 So I think Card is right that there are some lessons for feminists to learn
 here. Feminism involves seeing the world in a certain way, paying attention to
 gendered aspects of social interaction and the ways in which these interactions
 can hurt women. To a certain extent, all women are worse off as a result of
 oppression. However, we need to realize that the ways that some women ex
 perience these wrongs are much worse than others, and that not all of women's
 experience is of a piece. Some people are hurt much more than others, and
 their situation is, as a result, more morally pressing. We need to pay more at
 tention to the worst off members of our society. Comparing the inequality in
 faculty salaries (a mere injustice) to rape (a real evil), we can see where we
 ought to focus our efforts.
 Does this mean that we ought never to pay attention to unjust inequalities?
 Recall that Card's version of the priority doesn't say that evils need always
 come first. It's not a lexical priority view. But even assuming something
 weaker-that our main focus as feminists ought to be combating evil-then
 what can we or ought we to do about inequalities? I suggest that we often need
 to focus on eliminating inequalities as a route to ending evils. That is, we can
 agree with Card's claim that evils matter intrinsically, while inequalities do
 not, and still think there is a lot of space on the agenda of feminism for fighting
 inequalities. That's because the best path to ending some evils is through end
 ing inequalities.
 Consider the example of disparities in income between men and women.
 At one level this is merely, on Card's view, an unjust inequality. When we
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 compare the unjust inequality of income disparity with the real evil of domestic
 violence, it's clear to me that the latter is more morally pressing than the for
 mer. As feminists we ought to care more about domestic violence and less
 about unequal salaries. Yet unequal salaries and domestic violence are not un
 related. As we carefully point out to our undergraduate students in our
 introductory women's studies and feminist philosophy classes, violence against
 women occurs in all social classes. Still, income is not totally irrelevant. What
 makes a difference is not total household income-as if battering happened in
 the homes of the poor but not the rich-but rather the difference in income
 between husband and wife. According to a 1991 study of data from the Na
 tional Crime Survey, an employed, white, married woman with no children
 and an average educational background would have her probability of being
 abused decreased by 34% if her income increased by 20% (Mahony 1995, 17).
 Spousal income disparity is strongly correlated with domestic violence and
 other forms of abuse; the reasons are easy to understand. The threat of exit is
 most plausible when women earn enough independently to provide for them
 selves. It's not that women ever need to explicitly threaten or bargain; couples
 are usually aware of how exit-averse their partners are and this information
 plays a role in the marital conditions one creates. In Kidding Ourselves:
 Breadwinning, Babies, and Bargaining Power, Rhona Mahony applies some of
 the principles of game theory to family life. She puts the connection between
 income and domestic violence this way: "A woman who has a higher income
 can walk out on a violent man more easily. Or she can more credibly threaten
 that she'll walk out" (Mahony 1995, 18). Children decrease women's bargain
 ing power in a marriage, because women need more income to plausibly
 threaten they will leave at a time when they are likely earning less. According
 to Mahony, if we hold everything else constant, adding a child under the age of
 12 to a marriage increases the probability that a woman will be battered by 50%
 (Mahony 1995, 18). Thus, measures that equalize incomes between spouses
 may be justified, not because income inequality between men and women is
 itself a bad thing (though it might be that too), but rather because it's a con
 tributing factor to domestic violence. The first reason, then, that equality and
 evil are linked concerns women's bargaining position within the family.
 A second point about the connection between evils and inequalities con
 cerns the expressivist function of unequal treatment. If I am treated differently
 because of my gender and made worse off as a result, the harm that I have suf
 fered may not be limited to the actual cost of such treatment, or at least not in
 all cases. Consider the example Card uses, drawn from her own experience as
 a student. As a woman, she was barred from using the undergraduate men's
 library at Harvard, while at the same time men were allowed access to the li
 brary at Radcliffe. This might not have been so bad except that some of the
 books required for her courses were available only in the men's library. Female
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 students were encouraged to ask male classmates or male friends to check out
 the needed books, but one wonders about the situation of women who were too
 shy to ask, or who were not friends with any of their male classmates. Card
 writes: "This affront to my dignity, however, was compensated to no small ex
 tent by the privilege of being able to study at Harvard in the first place, in the
 same classrooms (not true for Radcliffe students of Helen Keller's era) and was
 not something that agitated me or even occupied my thoughts much, although
 the difference between the Lamont and the Radcliffe Library policies did sym
 bolize the judgment that female students were less important members of the
 university community than male students" (Card 2002, 105).
 If we think about the damage done merely in terms of the inconvenience,
 then the damage is relatively minor. But the message delivered by the unequal
 treatment may be much more harsh. We may think of the policy as saying
 "Women do not belong here." If that same person is denied access to the uni
 versity club on the basis of her gender, or not asked to lunch by male
 colleagues, or not included in meetings, or dismissed in decision-making pro
 cesses, then over time she can be hurt very badly. We see that small harms can
 add up. The video Chilly Climate for Women in Colleges and Universities calls this
 the "ton of feathers" effect (1991). Each harm is itself small, but together they
 can seriously harm women.
 The Barnard report, "Women, Work, and the Academy," calls these small
 harms "micro-inequalities," noting that they are all small and everyday in
 stances of unequal treatment that harm women and minority academics.
 According to the report's authors, "Gender and race bias exists in the social
 fabric of everyday interaction; it is articulated in persistent, small-scale, but
 systematic differences in recognition, evaluation, and response that reflect the
 expectations central to conventional gender and race schemas .... The result
 ing 'micro-inequities' are cumulative, generating substantial and persistent
 differences in outcome along gender lines" (Wylie, Jackson, and Fosado 2007).
 Card writes that sometimes what happens is that the symbolic meaning of a
 form of treatment can turn it into an evil, independently of the nature of the
 treatment (Card 2002, 104). If such exclusions continue over time, "when
 one's life becomes permeated by such exclusions," they take on an importance
 they otherwise would not have had" (Card 2002, 104). Thus whether or not a
 pattern of exclusion becomes an evil, instead of merely unequal treatment, de
 pends partly on the past experiences, family and community support, and
 emotional resources on which one can draw. Some people are more resilient
 than others, and a series of acts that may constitute an evil in one case may be
 only a series of unjust inequalities in another. Consider that students who ar
 rive at university with a history of exclusion and discrimination may be less
 able to bear the burden of even small inequalities. Women of color, for exam
 ple, may not come to university with the attitude that they deserve to be there
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 or that they belong. Consider the following quote from an African American
 woman studying science, being interviewed about her experiences at univer
 sity: "I get the feeling I do when I walk through somebody's house with shoes
 on. Like I'm in somebody else's home and I'm improperly walking, when I'm in
 science" (Anderson, Johnson, and Norlock 2009).
 All unjust, unequal treatment sends a message that can be damaging in ad
 dition to the harm done directly by the unjust inequality; in some cases this
 may be sufficient to make it an evil. It may well be that in addition to the
 inequalities in the university environment there are also genuine evils. Recall
 that on Card's definition, what is central is not the intent of the wrongdoer but
 rather the severity of the harm to the victim. "Evils tend to ruin lives, or sig
 nificant parts of lives," writes Card. So in cases in which lives are ruined-and I
 think here of the worst of the sexual harassment cases-there may be both evil
 and unjust inequality at work.
 Focusing on the content-say a difference in salary-can make it seem as
 though women are merely concerned about their own financial well-being, or
 as if achieving the abstract goal of equality mattered in and of itself. Combatt
 ing these sorts of inequalities can send a message that women are of equal moral
 worth to men and deserve equal concern and respect. Women's lack of worth is
 implicated in acts of evil as well, so combating the message targets evil at the
 same time as it targets inequality.
 I began by saying I was going to take Card's view about evil as a given and
 not worry too much about its details. But I'd like to speak up here for the re
 silient people, and say that I'm not sure that feminist moral theorists ought to
 be so fast to deem an act as "evil" on the basis of its life-ruining effects. Radical
 feminists, in particular, should worry about basing their political goals on sub
 jective accounts of the good. Suppose I am not hurt by unequal treatment, not
 because I'm resilient but instead because I think I deserve it. I believe truly that
 women merit less than men, simply on the basis of our gender. It's a mad view
 but some women hold it. We can likewise imagine women who believe that
 women who stray from traditional roles deserve sexual harassment. Surely what
 we want to say is that I ought to be offended (even if I'm not), and were I rea
 sonable, I'd mind (even if I don't). Radical feminists have not had qualms
 about speaking in revisionist terms about women's stated preferences, so it
 seems a bit odd to find this lurking subjectivism in Card's theory, given her
 sympathies with radical versions of feminist theory.
 Let's return to the goals of liberal feminism. We might want more women
 in elected office, more women in higher education, more women in the legal
 professions, and more women in leadership roles in our society more generally,
 not just because we think that achieving equality in these occupations is a good
 thing or we think it's good for individual women to achieve, but also because
 we think it's the best route to other sorts of social change, including the
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 elimination of evils. On Card's view, we ought to be more concerned with giv
 ing people refuge from abusive relationships than we should be with
 eliminating subtle gender differences in law-school admissions. Again, my
 claim is that there are serious and important connections between issues of law
 school admission and legal reform more generally, and strategies for getting
 women out of abusive relationships. Therefore, I am not disagreeing with Card
 about what should get our priority, merely noting that some of the best routes
 to ending evil may involve attacking inequalities. As well, those of us in
 positions of power within our institutions may take on the elimination of
 inequalities because of our participation in perpetuating inequalities if we do
 not. Thus, when I chair a graduate admissions committee, edit a journal,
 provide an external promotion and tenure report, or chair a promotion and
 tenure committee, these provide very concrete opportunities for me to change
 the way decisions are made.
 Card considers the strategy of targeting evils indirectly in her discussion of
 what it means to prioritize evil. She writes that it may be that improving fair
 ness in wages alleviates poverty and so might reduce the incidence of domestic
 abuse (Card 2002, 109). However, she thinks we still need to target resources at
 evils directly, in part because the impact of measures aimed only indirectly at
 evils is less certain (Card 2002, 109). I am not so sure about this. When I think
 about a particular instance of the kind of evil that concerns Card-say, for ex
 ample, domestic abuse-it's not so clear to me what kind of efforts make a
 difference other than increasing women's choices more generally. This link
 between inequality and evil also shows that there is much common ground
 between so-called liberal and radical approaches to feminism. Liberal feminism
 goes wrong when its advocates say that ending inequalities counts as the only
 or even the main kind of progress we might want. We also run the risk of for
 getting some of the reasons we care about ending inequalities in the first place.
 Radical feminism goes wrong when it limits routes to ending evils against
 women to only those that don't target the end of inequalities. We can make
 mistakes by paying too much attention to equality for its own sake, and we can
 also make mistakes by thinking that any attention paid to equality is in error.
 Notes
 Thanks to Andrea Veltman, Kathyrn Norlock, and Tracy Isaacs for very helpful comments
 on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks also to the Social and Political Theory program at
 the Australian National University, my research home during the time this paper was
 written, and to the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, also at the Australian
 National University, for hearing a version of this talk in their weekly seminar series.
 1. I am somewhat uneasy about restricting this to North American women be
 cause not all North American women lead lives of privilege, and because the situation
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 elsewhere may be very similar. I'm writing this paper in Australia and much the same
 analysis may apply here.
 2. I first heard of this example on Chris MacDonald's business ethics blog, http://
 www.businessethics.ca/blog/2007/ll/sexism-in-coffee-shops.html (accessed August 21,
 2008).
 3. I use the phrase "double-anonymous" rather than the usual "double-blind" ref
 ereeing because philosophers ought to use direct speech, rather than metaphors, where
 possible. The use of the term "blind" meaning "lacking knowledge" isn't just a lousy
 metaphor; it's also ableist. A reader, blind in the literal sense, would have as much in
 formation as a sighted reader thanks to text readers. Thanks very much to Shelly
 Tremain for bringing this to my attention.
 4. Thanks to Tom Hurka for bringing this to my attention and to John Kekes for
 writing about this neglected area of egalitarian concern (Kekes 1997).
 5. I sometimes speculate about why this is so. I think it's because we tend to look
 up at those who earn more?say doctors and lawyers?and don't really pay attention to
 the very many people around us who earn less. It's also related to class. Many of the
 academics I know are children of doctors and lawyers and earn less than their parents.
 These same people also grew up with friends who went on to become doctors and law
 yers. My own case is very different. As a child of working-class parents, the first person in
 my family to attend university, I heard my professors complain about how badly paid
 they were and thought I might not be able to afford to become a professor. I was
 shocked, though relieved, to discover that they made more than twice as much as my
 parents. We also tend to think we work very hard so we deserve to earn more, especially
 after all those years of graduate school. But I look around at how hard many people work,
 especially those juggling child care and multiple jobs, and think that academics, by and
 large, have very nice lives.
 6. A very useful discussion of the relationship between utilitarianism and equality
 can be found in chapter two of Kymlicka 2001.
 7. The phrase "culture of narcissism" comes from Lasch 1979.
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